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Abstract 
Newton’s earliest publications contained scandalous epistemological claims: not only did he 
aim for certainty, but claimed success!  Some commentators argue that Newton ultimately gave 
up claims of certainty in favour of a high degree of probability.  I argue that no such shift 
occurred.  I examine the evidence of a probabilistic shift: a passage from query 23/31 of the 
Opticks and rule 4 of the Principia.  Neither passage supports a probabilistic approach to natural 
philosophy.  The aim of certainty, then, was an enduring feature of Newton’s methodology. 
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1 Introduction 
Newton’s first optical paper (February 1672) contained a scandalous epistemological statement: 
not only did he aim for certain theories, but claimed success!  Some of Newton’s modern 
commentators claim that Newton eventually relinquished his claims of certainty, admitting only 
a high degree of probability.  This view has been perpetuated by Alan Shapiro (e.g. Shapiro 
1989, 225, 1993, 14) and, endorsed more recently, by Niccolò Guicciardini (Guicciardini 2011, 
20).  Shapiro views Newton’s probabilist shift as gradual and somewhat private.  He argues that 
the first shift occurred less than six months after writing that first optical paper—on the basis of 
the criticisms (Shapiro 1989, 228-29).  However, he argues, Newton’s first public statement of 
probabilism didn’t occur until many years later.1  Shapiro writes, “Only in the last decades of 
his life did [Newton] accept the probabilism of his contemporaries” (Shapiro 1993, 14).2 
Gradual though it may have been, this is a significant shift in Newton’s thought.  Newton’s 
notion of certainty permeates his views, not only on the aim of science, but also the nature of 
evidence, the nature of scientific reasoning, and how he saw his achievements in mathematics 
and natural philosophy (e.g. Walsh 2011).  Shapiro has identified two key pieces of textual 
evidence for this shift: the first, a response to Hooke in June 1672; and the second, an explicit 
statement of probabilism in query 23/31 of the Opticks (introduced in 1717).3 
I argue that Newton remained committed to certainty.  Firstly, I examine the relevant 
passage from query 23/31 of the Opticks and a related passage, rule 4, from the Principia.  I 
argue that neither of these passages should be interpreted as supporting probabilism.  Secondly, 
I examine the relevant passage from Newton’s correspondence with Hooke in 1672.  I argue 
that this passage expresses a similar qualified notion of certainty as that which Newton had 
expressed two years earlier, in his Optical Lectures in 1670.  Finally, I characterise Newton’s 
notion of certainty as ‘compelled assent’, and conclude that this was an enduring feature of 
Newton’s methodology. 
2 1717: Newton’s First Public Statement of Probabilism? 
That Newton claimed some kind of certainty in his early work (in his first optical paper, for 
instance) is uncontroversial.  Exactly what this ‘certainty’ amounted to is less clear.  I offer an 
account of this in the final section.  For now, let’s put this issue to one side and focus on 
Newton’s apparent shift to probabilism.  In this section, I’ll assess Shapiro’s claim that a passage 
from query 23/31 should be interpreted as probabilism.  First, I introduce the relevant passage 
                                                 
1 Alan Shapiro, private correspondence. 
2 See also (Shapiro 1989, 225). 
3 It is interesting to note that Guicciardini endorses the first shift, but not the second (c.f. 
Guicciardini 2011, 20 & 14). 
Copyright Philosophy of Science 2017 
Preprint (not copyedited or formatted) 
Please use DOI when citing or quoting 
 
from query 23/31 and a related passage from the Principia—rule 4—clarifying the standard 
(probabilistic) interpretation of these passages.  I then offer an alternative interpretation, based 
on the application of rule 4 to Newton’s argument for universal gravitation: rule 4 advises us to 
adjust the scope of generalisations, not our credence.  Applying this thinking to the original 
passage, I conclude that this isn’t a statement of probabilism and so doesn’t represent a shift in 
Newton’s thinking about certainty. 
2.1 The Probabilist Interpretation of Query 23/31 and Rule 4 
In 1717, Newton published the second edition of the Opticks, in which he re-labelled query 23 
as ‘query 31’,4 and expanded the methodological discussion.  Here, Newton described his 
methods of analysis and synthesis (or composition).  Newton’s method of analysis involved 
drawing general propositions from observations and experiments, and more generally, inferring 
causes from effects.  The method of composition is the inverse: we assume the causes and infer 
their effects.  The ordering of these methods was important: the method of composition should 
always follow the method of analysis, using the causes discovered by analysis to explain their 
effects, thus “explaining the Phænomena” and “proving the Explanations” (Newton 1952, 405).5 
Expanding on his method of analysis, Newton wrote the following (which I’ll refer to as 
‘P’): 
If no Exception occur from Phænomena, the Conclusion may be pronounced generally.  
But if at any time afterwards any Exception shall occur from Experiments, it may then 
begin to be pronounced with such Exceptions as occur (Newton 1952, 404). 
We might be forgiven for interpreting P in hypothetico-deductive terms, as it seems to suggest 
that the epistemic status of a theory ought to be sensitive to new evidence.  Indeed, according to 
Shapiro, this is Newton’s first public probabilistic statement. 
This is a mistake. 
To understand why, we should see how Newton applied P in practice.  Although P was not 
invoked explicitly in the Opticks, the same notion can be found in another late addition to 
Newton’s work, rule 4 of the Principia.6 
                                                 
4 I follow convention in referring to this as ‘query 23/31’. 
5 In this passage, Newton interchangeably referred to the methods of composition and 
synthesis.  For discussion, see (Ducheyne 2012, 6-8 & 18-25) and (Guicciardini 2011, 74-78). 
6 While the Opticks and the Principia ostensibly deal with different subject matter, query 
23/31 goes beyond optics, to discuss various forces, motions and systems, including universal 
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In the third edition of the Principia (1726), Newton added a fourth ‘rule for 
philosophising’:7 
Rule 4. In experimental philosophy, propositions gathered from phenomena by induction 
should be considered either exactly or very nearly true notwithstanding any contrary 
hypotheses, until yet other phenomena make such propositions either more exact or liable 
to exceptions. 
This rule should be followed so that arguments based on induction may not be nullified 
by hypotheses (Newton 1999, 796). 
The similarities between this rule and P are striking: that new evidence can make a proposition 
“either more exact or more liable to exceptions” is similar to pronouncing the conclusion either 
“more generally” or “with such Exceptions as occur”. 
Rule 4 looks like a pragmatic response to the problem of induction: Newton’s recognition 
that uncertainty was introduced by ampliative inference, i.e. generalising from particulars.8  The 
phrase “very nearly true” could mean ‘highly probable’.  So, it might seem reasonable to put the 
following hypothetico-deductive gloss on rule 4: 
If our best theory fits all the known facts, then we should act as though it is highly probable 
(i.e. tentatively accept it) until more facts either support or refute it. 
I take it that an interpretation of this kind is the source of Shapiro’s claim.9  However, I argue 
that this is a misinterpretation of rule 4.  Rule 4 was employed explicitly in the Principia—in 
the argument for universal gravitation.  This use should tell us how to interpret the rule itself 
and, by extension, P. 
                                                 
gravitation.  Moreover, query 23/31 discusses the other rules for philosophising—explicitly 
drawing methodological connections between the Principia and the Opticks.  So I believe I am 
justified in drawing this comparison. 
7 The rules act as explanatory constraints, or heuristics, enabling Newton to make inferences 
from phenomena and theorems to further theorems. 
8 For an account of Newton’s method of ‘inductive gradualism’, see (Ducheyne 2005). 
9 Indeed, Shapiro’s hypothetico-deductive reading of the development of Newton’s theory 
of fits (Shapiro 1993, 200) suggests that he supports the hypothetico-deductive interpretation of 
Newton’s method more generally. 
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2.2 Rule 4 and Newton’s Argument for Universal Gravitation 
In the Principia, Newton only explicitly employed rule 4 once, in his argument for universal 
gravitation, proposition 5 book 3: 
Proposition 5. The circumjovial planets gravitate toward Jupiter, the circumsaturnian 
planets gravitate toward Saturn, and the circumsolar planets gravitate toward the sun, 
and by the force of their gravity they are always drawn back from rectilinear motions and 
kept in curvilinear orbits (Newton 1999, 805). 
The argument takes the following form: 
P1. In system S1, effect E is caused by G. 
P2. The same effect E also occurs in systems S2, S3, …, Sn. 
P3. Whenever the same effect occurs, we should infer the same cause. 
P4. G is sufficient to cause E in systems S2, S3, …, Sn. 
P5. If G is sufficient to cause effect E in systems S2, S3, …, Sn, then we should 
infer G, and no other causes of E. 
C. In systems S2, S3, …, Sn, effect E is caused by G, and no other causes (from 
P1, P2, P3, P4 & P5). 
Newton’s argument for universal gravitation proceeds step-by-step from the motion of the moon 
with respect to the Earth, the motions of the moons of Jupiter and Saturn with respect to Jupiter 
and Saturn and the motions of the planets with respect to the Sun, to the forces producing those 
motions.  Thus, in this argument, system S1 refers to the two-body Earth-Moon system.  Systems 
S2, S3, …, Sn refer respectively to two-body systems involving Jupiter and each of its moons, 
Saturn and each of its moons, and the Sun and each of the planets. 
In the scholium following proposition 5, Newton said: 
Hitherto we have called ‘centripetal’ that force by which celestial bodies are kept in their 
orbits.  It is now established that this force is gravity, and therefore we shall call it gravity 
from now on.  For the cause of the centripetal force by which the moon is kept in its orbit 
ought to be extended to all the planets, by rules 1, 2, and 4 (Newton 1999, 806). 
Rules 1 and 2 tell us not to postulate more causes than are sufficient for the effect (P5), and that 
we should assume that effects of the same kind have causes of the same kind (P3).  Rule 4 tells 
us that (a) we ought to regard proposition 5 as “either exactly or very nearly true”, (b) new 
observational evidence may make proposition 5 “either more exact or liable to exceptions”, and 
(c) proposition 5 may not be refuted by “contrary hypotheses”.  I noted above that rule 4 seems 
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to invite us to regard propositions as highly probable until other evidence either increases or 
decreases our credence in the proposition. 
I now suggest an alternative reading of this rule, addressing the three parts of rule 4 in turn. 
a) We ought to regard proposition 5 as “either exactly or very nearly true”. 
This tells us what epistemic attitude we should take to propositions.  The phrase “either exactly 
or very nearly true” is usually interpreted as ‘highly probable’.  However, I now argue for an 
alternative reading of this passage.  In the original Latin, the relevant phrase in rule 4 appears 
as “[…] pro veris aut accurate aut quamproxime haberi debent […]” (Newton 1972, 555).  In 
Latin, quamproxime literally means ‘closest (proxime) in the highest possible degree (quam)’.  
In their translation of the Principia (Newton 1999), Cohen and Whitman translate the phrase as 
‘very nearly’.  Indeed, out of context, this seems to be a reasonable translation.  However, many 
commentators agree that this does not capture the strength and significance of the phrase when 
used by Newton.  For example, Ducheyne has made a strong case for the translation “as most 
closely as possible” (Ducheyne 2013, 82-92), whereas George Smith prefers to treat 
‘quamproxime’ as a technical term (e.g. Smith 2002).10 
So what does quamproxime mean in this context?  Newton approached universal gravitation 
via a series of increasingly complex model systems.  In book 1 of the Principia, he modelled 
the laws of motion in a one-body system, establishing that a body would display perfect 
Keplerian motion when acted on by an inverse square centripetal force.  This is because, in a 
one-body system, there is no mutual attraction.  But, once he added a second body, he found 
that, if a body displays Keplerian motion quamproxime, then it is maintained by a centripetal 
force directed quamproxime towards a central body (Newton 1999, 448).  That is, the 
consequent holds quamproxime as long as the antecedent holds quamproxime.  ‘Quamproxime’ 
captures the degree to which orbits are perturbed by other bodies in the system. 
In short, this phrase tells us that we should take this proposition as true, which is to say it 
captures the essential dynamics of the system. 
b) New observational evidence may make proposition 5 “either more exact or liable to 
exceptions”. 
This tells us what to do in the face of new evidence.  The probabilist reading says that new 
evidence either increases or decreases our credence in the proposition.  I prefer a different 
interpretation: if exceptions to proposition 5 occur, instead of reducing our credence in the 
proposition, we should add detail (thus, making it more accurate), or de-generalise the 
                                                 
10 On the role of ‘quamproxime propositions’ in the Principia, see (Ducheyne 2013, 82-92) 
and (Smith 2002, 155-56). 
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proposition (thus, restricting the domain to which it applies).  De-generalising a proposition 
does not reduce certainty; rather, it reduces the proposition’s scope while maintaining certainty. 
Newton expressed this idea much more clearly in draft material: 
If a proposition gathered by induction is not sufficiently accurate, then it should be 
corrected, not by introducing (ad hoc) hypotheses, but by more widely and accurately 
observed phenomena of nature.  If this turns out impossible, however, then the proposition 
should be de-generalized (Ducheyne 2012, 119).11 
Thus, if faced with ‘contrary instances’, we should reduce the domain to which the proposition 
applies: it is true, but true of fewer instances.  
c) Proposition 5 may not be refuted by “contrary hypotheses”. 
This claim instructs us in the treatment of ‘contrary hypotheses’.  A theory’s uncertainty could 
be sourced in countervailing evidence or competing theories.  (c) is often interpreted as denying 
that competing theories can change our credence in the present theory.  Take Peter Achinstein’s 
reading, for example: 
There may be another hypothesis, incompatible with yours, from which the same 
phenomena can be derived and explained.  If so, then, according to the hypothetico-
deductivist, that hypothesis would also be established.  But two incompatible hypotheses 
can’t both be established on the basis of the same phenomena.  From the ‘mere possibility’ 
of a hypothesis—that is, from the mere fact that it entails and explains a range of 
phenomena—you cannot conclude that it is true (Achinstein 2013, 74-75). 
Similarly, Bill Harper takes contrary hypotheses as alternative propositions that are not 
“sufficiently supported empirically to be counted as serious rivals” (Harper 2011, 109).  Such 
interpretations, we shall see, miss the point.  Newton tells us that hypotheses must not influence 
our epistemic attitude towards the theory (i.e. proposition 5).  That is, according to rule 4, only 
phenomena (i.e. observed motions of celestial bodies) can influence the universality of 
proposition 5. 
My interpretation of this claim turns on Newton’s (unique) distinction between ‘theories’ 
and ‘hypotheses’.  Although well-established among Newton scholars, the distinction is not 
well-understood, so it is worth covering here. 
                                                 
11 Ducheyne’s translation and paraphrasing of draft material relating to the Principia, 2nd 
edition. 
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In Newton’s methodology, theories and hypotheses deal with different subject matter, have 
different epistemic statuses, and perform different roles.  Theories systematise the observable, 
measurable properties of things; hypotheses describe the (unobservable) nature of things.  
Theories are inferred from observation and experiment; hypotheses are speculative.  For 
example, Newton saw universal gravitation as a theory, since it was inferred from celestial and 
terrestrial observations, and systematised those observations.  However, an explanation of the 
nature and cause of gravity would be a hypothesis, since it concerns the unobservable, and is 
speculative, rather than inferred from experiment.  The distinction is nicely captured in a draft 
letter from Newton to Roger Cotes (March 1713): 
One may suppose that bodies may by an unknown power be perpetually accelerated and 
so reject the first law of motion.  One may suppose that God can create a penetrable body 
and so reject the impenetrability of matter.  But to admit of such hypotheses in opposition 
to rational propositions founded upon phenomena by induction is to destroy all arguments 
taken from phenomena by induction and all principles founded upon such arguments 
(Newton 2004, 120). 
Recall that rule 4 tells us that hypotheses may not refute or alter “arguments gathered from 
phenomena”, namely, theories.  For Newton, theories were on epistemically surer footing than 
hypotheses because they were grounded in phenomena, whereas hypotheses were grounded in 
speculation.  When faced with disagreement between hypotheses and theories, we should 
modify the hypothesis to fit the theory, not vice versa.  Newton explained this idea in the same 
letter to Cotes: 
And therefore as I regard not hypotheses in explaining the phenomena of nature, so I 
regard them not in opposition to arguments founded upon phenomena by induction or to 
principles settled upon such arguments.  In arguing for any principle or proposition from 
phenomena by induction, hypotheses are not to be considered.  The argument holds good 
till some phenomenon can be produced against it (Newton 2004, 120).12 
So, according to rule 4: 
1. In the absence of exceptions, we should take gravity to be universal; 
2. If exceptions to universal gravitation are found, we should infer that the domain of the theory 
of gravitation is limited (i.e. not universal); and 
                                                 
12 This is the idea Newton expressed with his (in)famous phrase ‘hypotheses non fingo’ 
(Newton 1972, 584). 
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3. We should not allow our imagined possibilities (e.g. the possibility of a penetrable body), 
or assumptions about natural mechanisms (e.g. the implausibility of action at a distance), to 
have any influence on our epistemic attitude towards universal gravitation. 
Rule 4, then, should not be read probabilistically.  Newton uses it to claim that the theory of 
universal gravitation is certain, that exceptions should lead us to restrict the domain of the 
theory, and that ideas about the nature of gravitation, that is, hypotheses about it, should play 
no epistemic role.  Let’s apply this kind of thinking to query 23/31. 
2.3 Revisiting Query 23/31 
Recall P: 
If no Exception occur from Phænomena, the Conclusion may be pronounced generally.  
But if at any time afterwards any Exception shall occur from Experiments, it may then 
begin to be pronounced with such Exceptions as occur (Newton 1952, 404). 
This passage is similar to part of rule 4 of the Principia: new observational evidence may make 
a theory “either more exact or liable to exceptions” (Newton 1999, 796).  From its application 
in the argument for universal gravitation (proposition 5), we have seen that rule 4 tells us, in the 
face of refutation, to update a theory’s scope, not its epistemic warrant.  Generalisations may 
be de-generalised, but de-generalisation does not reduce credence.  That is, it doesn’t take you 
from certainty to probability.  P should be read in the same way.  Newton doesn’t suggest that 
we lower our credence in the face of countervailing evidence; rather, we should maintain 
certainty, but decrease scope. 
3 June 1672 and Newton’s Early Optical Work 
In this section, I assess Shapiro’s claim that Newton’s response to Robert Hooke (June 1672) 
represents the first stage in a gradual shift in Newton’s thinking about certainty.  Firstly, I’ll get 
clearer on Shapiro’s claim by contrasting Newton’s February 1672 statement with his response 
to Hooke in June 1672.  We’ll see that, in June 1672, Newton’s claims about certainty are 
apparently more moderate than the statement from February 1672.  This lends prima facie 
support to Shapiro’s position.  However, I’ll challenge Shapiro’s position with a methodological 
passage from Newton’s Optical Lectures, completed in 1670.  In this passage, Newton offers a 
moderate view, similar to the view he expressed in June 1672.  This suggests that June 1672 
does not mark a shift in Newton’s thinking about certainty.  Rather, Newton’s notion of certainty 
was always somewhat moderate—but never probabilistic.  I’ll close by arguing that Newton’s 
moderate ‘certainty’ is compelled assent. 
3.1 June 1672 and Newton’s Response to Hooke 
Let’s consider Newton’s scandalous statement from February 1672: 
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A naturalist would scearce expect to see ye science of [colours] become mathematicall, & 
yet I dare affirm that there is as much certainty in it as in any other part of Opticks.  For 
what I shall tell concerning them is not an hypothesis but most rigid consequence, not 
conjectured by barely inferring ’tis thus because not otherwise or because it satisfies all 
Phænomena (the Philosophers universall Topick,) but evinced by ye mediation of 
experiments concluding directly & without any suspicion of doubt (Newton 1959-1977, 
Vol. 1, 96-97). 
These are surprising ideas.  While the Royal Society valued epistemic responsibility,13 Newton 
claimed certainty (apparently) without warrant.  Indeed, the passage was omitted from the 
published version!14  Hooke was one of the few of Newton’s contemporaries who read the 
passage; and it jarred.  He objected that Newton was not justified in claiming that his theory was 
mathematically certain. 
Newton responded that he had never claimed mathematical certainty: 
I should take notice of a casuall expression wch intimates a greater certainty in these things 
then I ever promised, viz. The certainty of Mathematical Demonstrations (Newton 1959-
1977, Vol. 1, 187). 
He contrasted ‘mathematical certainty’ with the certainty offered by the ‘mathematical 
sciences’.  While the former is achieved by reasoning to mathematical theorems from 
mathematical principles; the latter starts with physical principles and reasons mathematically to 
physical propositions.  Newton claimed to have achieved this latter certainty: 
Now the evidence by wch I asserted the Propositions of colours is in the next words 
expressed to be from Experiments & so but Physicall: Whence the Propositions 
themselves can be esteemed no more then Physicall Principles of a Science (Newton 
1959-1977, Vol. 1, 187). 
And from such physical principles, reasoning mathematically, Newton had derived a theory of 
colour.  Therefore, his science of colours was “Mathematicall & as certain as any part of 
Optiques” (Newton 1959-1977, Vol. 1, 188). 
In this explanation, Newton suggests a more moderate certainty—pointing out that the 
certainty possible in optics is limited.  He explained that the science of colours, 
                                                 
13 (e.g. Locke 1997/1690, Hooke 1966/1665, Preface). 
14 (c.f. Newton 1959-1977, Vol. 1, 96-97, 1672, 3077) 
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Optiques & many other Mathematicall Sciences depend as well on Physicall Principles as 
on Mathematicall Demonstrations: And the absolute certainty of a Science cannot exceed 
the certainty of its Principles (Newton 1959-1977, Vol. 1, 187). 
So according to Newton, certainty in optics is limited by (at least) two things. Firstly, a 
proposition’s certainty is constrained by the certainty of its principles. Secondly, optical 
principles are experimental, and hence, not mathematically certain.  It is easy to see why Shapiro 
interprets this as a subtle shift towards probabilism.  In February 1672 Newton emphasised the 
mathematism and certainty of his theory, but in June 1672, he emphasised the lack of 
mathematical certainty and the experimental basis of the theory.  In the following section, 
however, I argue that no such shift occurred. 
3.2 Optical Lectures and Newton’s Mathematico-Experimental Method 
Newton’s approach was based on the idea that mathematics is a bearer of certainty—one can 
reason deductively from certain axioms to theorems, without losing certainty.  Moreover, this 
method of reasoning is applicable to natural philosophy: one can reason deductively from laws 
and principles to propositions in natural philosophy, without epistemic loss.  So, if one can 
establish certain natural philosophical laws or principles, it is possible to reason mathematically 
to certain propositions.  Furthermore, Newton thought it was possible to establish a certain 
principle via a single experiment!15 
Newton first indicated such a method in his Optical Lectures, which were completed by 
1670.16  He argued that natural philosophy should combine the insights of experimental 
philosophy and geometry—experimental techniques can rigorously investigate nature, while 
mathematical techniques enable reasoning to sound conclusions.  In this way, we achieve an 
exact science (“accurata scientia” (Newton 1984, 86/438))—a science that yields perfectly 
accurate knowledge of the world.  The passage is worth quoting in extenso: 
Thus although colours may belong to physics, the science of them must nevertheless be 
considered mathematical, insofar as they are treated by mathematical reasoning.  Indeed, 
since an exact science of them seems to be one of the most difficult that philosophy is in 
need of, I hope to show—as it were, by my example—how valuable mathematics is in 
natural philosophy.  I therefore urge geometers to investigate nature more rigorously, and 
those devoted to natural science to learn geometry first.  Hence the former shall not 
                                                 
15 In this mathematico-experimental methodology, Newton was almost certainly influenced 
by Isaac Barrow (e.g. Dunlop 2012, Guicciardini 2011, Shapiro 1993). 
16 Newton lodged two different versions with the Cambridge University Library.  For 
transcriptions and translations, see (Newton 1984). 
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entirely spend their time in speculations of no value to human life, nor shall the latter, 
while working assiduously with an absurd method, fail to reach their goal.  But truly with 
the help of philosophical geometers and geometrical philosophers, instead of the 
conjectures and probabilities that are being blazoned about everywhere, we shall finally 
achieve a natural science supported by the greatest evidence (Newton 1984, 87-89/439). 
In this passage, Newton contrasted the product of his mathematico-experimental method, “a 
natural science supported by the greatest evidence”, with the “conjectures and probabilities” 
produced by less rigorous investigation and reasoning.  Here, Newton explicitly presents his 
methodology in opposition to those who, “working assiduously with an absurd method”, reach 
only probabilities rather than certainties.  The passage shows us that what Newton had in mind, 
even in 1670, was a science of optics, grounded in experiment and observation, and 
mathematical only “insofar as [colours] are treated by mathematical reasoning”.  He didn’t claim 
to have achieved mathematical certainty, but only the kind of certainty that could be achieved 
in natural philosophy from careful experiments and mathematical reasoning—just like in June 
1672. 
4 Closing Remarks: Certainty as ‘Compelled Assent’ 
And so, Newton did not become a probabilist—he remained committed to the view that his 
methods produced certainty.  But he did not mean mathematical certainty.  What, then, is 
Newtonian certainty? 
I close with a brief suggestion:17 Newton’s certainty can be characterised as ‘compelled 
assent’.18  When Newton claimed certainty, it was because he thought the evidence compelled 
him undeniably to his conclusion.  For example, in his first paper (February 1672), Newton 
wrote: 
And so the true cause […] was detected to be no other then that Light consists of Rays 
differently refrangible […] (Newton 1959-1977, Vol. 1, 95—underlining added). 
And to Hooke (June 1672), he wrote: 
And that this whitenesse is produced onely by a successive intermixture of the colours 
without their being assimilated or reduced to any uniformity, is certainly beyond all 
possibility of doubting […] (Newton 1959-1977, Vol. 1, 182-183—underlining added). 
                                                 
17 I develop this suggestion in (Walsh in preparation). 
18 This phrase comes from Barbara Shapiro (Shapiro 1983, 29). 
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There was a social aspect to this as well: Newton expected that others would draw the same 
conclusion in the same context.  For example, in his correspondence with Lucas (August 1676), 
Newton wrote: 
[Let Lucas examine the experiments given.]  For if any of those be demonstrative, they 
will need no assistants nor leave room for further disputing about what they demonstrate.  
The main thing he goes about to examin is ye different refrangibility of light.  And this I 
demonstrated by ye Experimentum Crucis.  Now if this demonstration be good, there 
needs no further examination of ye thing; if not good ye fault of it is to be shewn, for ye 
only way to examin a demonstrated proposition is to examin ye demonstration (Newton 
1959-1977, Vol. 2, 79-80). 
So, as far as Newton was concerned, the experimentum crucis did not provide ‘mere’ empirical 
support; it proved that the “true cause” could be “no other” than the one he had identified 
(Newton 1959-1977, Vol. 1, 95).  And others, having carried out the same experiment, should 
be compelled to accept the same conclusion. 
This social aspect of Newton’s epistemology can be found in the Principia.  For example, 
in the scholium to the laws, he writes: “The principles I have set forth are accepted by 
mathematicians and confirmed by experiments of many kinds” (Newton 1999, 424).  And in his 
manuscript, De gravitatione, Newton writes: 
I have undertaken to demonstrate its [i.e. the science of fluid dynamics] individual 
propositions from abstract principles, sufficiently well known to the student, strictly and 
geometrically (Newton 2004, 12). 
And a few lines later: 
The foundations from which this science may be demonstrated are either definitions of 
certain words, or axioms and postulates no one denies (Newton 2004, 12). 
In these passages, Newton tells us that the abstract principles of this science are supposed to be 
“sufficiently well known to the student” or “definitions of certain words, or axioms and 
postulates no one denies”.  The emphasis on students implies undisputed and fundamental 
principles—i.e. the what a student learns by way of introduction to the field.  Newton expressed 
a similar notion in his Opticks (1704) while introducing the axioms: 
For what hath been generally agreed on I content my self to assume under the notion of 
Principles, in order to what I have farther to write.  And this may suffice for an 
Introduction to Readers of quick Wit and good Understanding not yet versed in Opticks 
[…] (Newton 1952, 20) 
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There are, then, three components to ‘compelled assent’: for Newton, some proposition is 
certain when given (1) the evidence cited, someone of sufficient (2) rationality (‘quick wit’) and 
(3) background knowledge (‘good understanding) would be forced to accept the truth of that 
proposition. 
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